Housing / Credit ABM Model
How do leverage, collateral values, and heterogeneous household balance sheets turn a housing or credit shock into an aggregate macro outcome with endogenous default cascades?
Graph workspace
Multi-panel time-series with distribution sidebar
Housing-credit ABMs produce stochastic time series (house prices, defaults, credit) alongside cross-sectional distributions (LTV distribution, wealth distribution). The canonical visualization pairs a time-series panel showing the boom-bust cycle with a histogram of the LTV distribution that shifts as the cycle progresses. This makes the connection between aggregate dynamics and distributional risk visible in one view.
Current results
House Price Index
Current level of the emergent house price index relative to period-0 baseline of 100.
101.97
index
Default Rate
Fraction of mortgaged households in default this period. Spikes during price downturns when the high-LTV tail hits negative equity.
0.00%
percent
Mean LTV
Average loan-to-value ratio across all mortgaged households. Rises during booms as new buyers enter at higher leverage.
0.5438
ratio
Bank Capital Ratio
Average bank capital ratio. Falls when mortgage defaults impose losses; recovery depends on new lending profitability.
0.5856
ratio
Controls
LTV cap: 0.9
Largest loan allowed against a home's value; below 0.9 no new loans happen here.
The cap does not compress the LTV distribution in the sketch, because every new loan enters in the same narrow 0.9-1.0 band regardless of where the cap sits. At or above 0.9 originations proceed; below 0.9 they stop and demand falls away. Read the Mechanics & Emergence tab for what a binding cap does in the model proper, where the down payment is not fixed at a single fraction of value.
Price sensitivity: 0.16
How strongly unmet buyer demand pushes house prices; higher settings mean choppier housing cycles.
A higher produces wider boom-bust oscillations in the price index and larger default spikes at cycle troughs.
Income volatility: 0.08
How much each household's own income jumps around from one period to the next.
Higher income volatility increases the baseline default rate and makes the LTV distribution fatter-tailed even during stable price periods.
Policy rate: 0.03
The central bank's rate, which feeds mortgage rates and what households can afford.
Rate hikes reduce maximum affordable mortgage, shift the demand curve left and, up to about 6.5 percent in this sketch, end with a lower price index; larger hikes can end above the default path here. They also increase payment burden for existing adjustable-rate borrowers. Negative rates compress the floor on lending margins.
Min bank capital ratio: 0.04
The capital level banks must stay above before they tighten lending standards.
Higher minimum triggers lending tightening earlier in a downturn, reducing the depth of the credit contraction but also limiting credit in normal times.