Rules, organizations and the macro path
Institutional economics grew up in the United States around the turn of the twentieth century. Thorstein Veblen's Theory of the Leisure Class (1899) introduced conspicuous leisure, the display of wealth and status through visible idleness [1], and his Theory of Business Enterprise (1904) studied the machine process of modern industry, the principles of the businessmen who direct it, and the use of loan credit and business capital [2]. John R. Commons's Institutional Economics (1934) belongs to the same American tradition [3].
The tradition shaped how the business cycle is measured. Arthur Burns and Wesley Mitchell's Measuring Business Cycles (1946), published by the National Bureau of Economic Research, set out the Bureau's statistical methods, including how specific cycles and business cycles are dated [4]. Gardiner Means's 1935 report to the US Senate argued that many industrial prices were relatively inflexible [5], a finding that interviews with 200 price setters confirmed six decades later: price stickiness is widespread in American industry, and firms are most reluctant to antagonize their customers [6]. The interviews also overturned some expectations: prices did not rise more easily than they fell, and firms did not raise prices in advance even when they could foresee cost increases.
A later wave asked why economies with similar resources perform so differently. Douglass North described institutions as the constraints people devise to structure their interaction, and argued that they shape economic performance both at a given time and over time [7]. Peter Hall and David Soskice distinguished liberal market economies from coordinated market economies and showed how institutions in labor markets, corporate finance and skill formation reinforce one another and give countries different comparative advantages [8]. Acemoglu and co-authors found that countries that inherited weaker institutions have been more volatile and more prone to crises, and that once institutions are controlled for, macroeconomic policies have only a minor effect [9]. In their data, societies where European colonists faced high mortality more than a century ago are much more volatile and prone to crises.
For macroeconomics the lesson is that the same shock can travel differently. Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) found that the rise of European unemployment since the 1960s, and its different size across 20 countries, came from the interaction of common shocks with each country's labor-market institutions [10]. Bank regulation that forces disclosure and empowers private monitoring is associated with more stable banking across 107 countries [11]. This guide's test is whether a named rule or organization explains the timing and size of the macro outcome.