This model asks how carbon pricing, climate damages and green innovation play out across many different firms, banks and households. Integrated assessment models (IAMs) such as Nordhaus's DICE (1992) and RICE optimize consumption for a single representative agent against a climate damage function, which leaves out three things that matter for climate-macro policy. First, the distribution of carbon intensity across firms: a carbon tax that raises the average cost by 5% might bankrupt the dirtiest 10% of firms while leaving clean firms unaffected, and the aggregate GDP effect depends on whether those bankruptcies cascade through supply chains and bank balance sheets. Second, the endogenous dynamics of green innovation: firms do not switch technologies instantaneously in response to a price signal - they invest, experiment, fail, and diffuse innovations through networks, and the speed of that process depends on the current distribution of technological capabilities as well as the carbon price level. Third, the financial system's role in amplifying or dampening transition risk: banks holding loans to carbon-intensive firms face correlated losses when policy tightens, and their response (tightening credit to all firms, including clean firms) can turn an orderly transition into a recession. Climate-macro ABMs exist to capture these three channels simultaneously.
The field crystallized around 2015-2020. Lamperti, Dosi, and colleagues at the Sant'Anna School built the DSK (Dystopian Schumpeter meeting Keynes) model in 'Faraway, so close' (2018, Ecological Economics), extending the Keynes+Schumpeter (K+S) macro ABM with a climate module: firms emit carbon as a byproduct of production, emissions accumulate in the atmosphere, atmospheric CO2 drives temperature change via a simplified climate model, and temperature anomalies cause stochastic damage to firm capital and household income. The headline finding came in the follow-up, 'The public costs of climate-induced financial instability' (Lamperti, Bosetti, Roventini, Tavoni 2019, Nature Climate Change): climate-induced financial instability - banks failing because their borrowers suffer climate damages - amplifies GDP losses by 15-30% beyond the direct damage channel. Lamperti et al. (2020, Technological Forecasting and Social Change) added green transition dynamics: firms can invest in green R&D to reduce emissions intensity, and the innovation process follows a stochastic search over a technology space. A later paper, 'Three green financial policies to address climate risks' (Lamperti et al. 2021, Journal of Financial Stability), turns to green macroprudential regulation, green quantitative easing, and carbon-risk-adjusted credit ratings rather than to carbon tax design. Ponta et al. (2018) built a separate climate-macro ABM focused on energy sector transition with heterogeneous power generators. Mercure et al. (2018) developed the FTT (Future Technology Transformations) model for global energy transition with evolutionary technology dynamics. Monasterolo and Raberto (2018) constructed EIRIN, a stock-flow consistent climate-macro ABM focused on the financial system's exposure to climate transition risk.
Central banks and financial regulators have picked up climate-macro ABMs for stress testing. The Network for Greening the Financial System (NGFS), which coordinates climate risk analysis across 130+ central banks, has published scenario frameworks that draw on ABM-derived insights about nonlinear transition risk. The ECB's climate stress test (2022) used scenario paths informed by models that capture firm heterogeneity in carbon exposure. The Bank of England's climate biennial exploratory scenario (CBES, 2021) included transition risk channels where carbon-intensive firm failures propagate through the banking system - a mechanism that only ABMs model endogenously. Academic use spans from pure climate-economy theory (Nordhaus critics like Keen, Farmer, Hepburn) to applied green industrial policy evaluation (subsidy design, carbon border adjustments, green bond markets).