Fiscal Policy & Inequality ABM Model
How do progressive taxation, targeted transfers, and public investment interact with household-level income heterogeneity and heterogeneous marginal propensities to consume to shape aggregate demand, growth, and the size of fiscal multipliers?
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Odd+D Protocol: Model Specification
The ODD+D (Overview, Design concepts, Details + Decision-making) protocol documents the fiscal-inequality ABM following Grimm et al. (2006, 2010) and Muller et al. (2013).
PURPOSE: The model explores how fiscal policy instruments - progressive/regressive taxation, targeted/universal transfers, and public investment - interact with household-level income and wealth heterogeneity to produce distributional fiscal multipliers that differ from the aggregate multiplier predicted by representative-agent models. The target audience includes fiscal policymakers evaluating the growth and inequality effects of alternative tax-and-transfer designs.
ENTITIES, STATE VARIABLES, AND SCALES: The model contains five entity types. Households ( to in research runs, 50 to 200 in toy demonstrations) carry state variables: gross income (continuous, positive), wealth (continuous, non-negative), MPC (continuous, 0 to 1, derived from wealth-to-income ratio), employment status (binary), tax liability (derived from income and schedule), transfer receipt (derived from income and eligibility), and consumption (derived from disposable income and MPC). Firms ( to ) carry: output, price, wage posted, and vacancy count. Banks ( to ) carry: loan portfolio and capital ratio. The government (single agent) carries: tax schedule parameters, transfer rules, spending level, and debt stock. The central bank (single agent) carries: policy rate. The temporal scale is quarterly periods over 20 to 80 quarters.
PROCESS OVERVIEW AND SCHEDULING: Each period proceeds in fixed order: (1) government announces fiscal parameters, (2) firms post vacancies and wages, (3) labor market matches, (4) production occurs, (5) household income is realized, (6) taxes are collected according to the schedule, (7) transfers are distributed according to targeting rules, (8) households make consumption decisions based on disposable income and wealth, (9) goods market clears, (10) firms update production plans, (11) credit market processes applications, (12) government updates budget position. This ordering ensures that the fiscal channel - from tax collection through transfer distribution to consumption response - is fully resolved within each period before feedback into the next period's production decisions.
Disposable income for household . Gross income minus progressive tax liability plus transfer receipt. The net fiscal flow () is positive for low-income households and negative for high-income households under progressive taxation.
Household 's MPC as a declining function of the wealth-to-income ratio. The parameter controls the curvature: a lower means the MPC drops faster as wealth rises. At zero wealth, . As wealth grows, MPC converges to .
Consumption is the MPC times disposable income plus a wealth draw-down when wealth exceeds a target buffer. The target buffer is proportional to permanent income. This two-part rule nests the permanent income hypothesis as a special case.
Empirical MPC gradient
Johnson, Parker, and Souleles (2006) found that households in the bottom income tercile spent 60-70% of the 2001 US tax rebate within two quarters, while top-tercile households spent 20-30%. Fagereng, Holm, and Natvik (2021) used Norwegian lottery winners to estimate MPCs by wealth decile: the bottom decile had an MPC of 0.85, the top decile 0.15. Parker et al. (2013) found similar patterns for the 2008 stimulus payments. This gradient is the single most important micro fact calibrating the model.
Why Ricardian equivalence fails empirically
The theoretical conditions for Ricardian equivalence - infinite horizons, perfect capital markets, lump-sum taxes, and rational expectations about future fiscal policy - are jointly unrealistic. Empirical tests (Bernheim 1987, Poterba and Summers 1987, more recently Sahm, Shapiro, and Slemrod 2012) consistently reject full Ricardian equivalence, finding that 20-40% of deficit-financed transfers are spent within the quarter. The ABM builds in partial Ricardian failure through bounded rationality and credit constraints.
Transition checks
Agent update
The aggregate is computed after individual states are updated. If the rule is nonlinear or stochastic, the aggregate can change abruptly even when the plotted line connects adjacent periods.
Each point is an aggregate after one model update. The connecting line helps the eye, but the law is discrete.
Do not read the line as a continuous differential equation unless one is stated.
Cutoff and contagion
The indicator changes value discontinuously at . Aggregates inherit that discontinuity when enough agents sit near the cutoff.
A cutoff creates a kink or jump because the update rule changes at the threshold.
Do not force a smooth explanation onto a chart section driven by threshold crossing.
Variable timing
Agent state
Agent states update at dates. Abrupt aggregate movement can come from many small state changes applied at once.
Aggregate readout
The aggregate can jump when the distribution changes shape or many agents cross a boundary.
Threshold indicator
The indicator turns on at the cutoff. That creates a discontinuity in the micro rule and possibly the aggregate.