The natural rate and the limits of monetary fine-tuning
Milton Friedman's presidential address to the American Economic Association, delivered in December 1967 and published in 1968 [1], set out two ideas that reshaped how central banks see their mandate. The first is the natural rate of unemployment: the rate the economy's real structure would produce, including market imperfections, the cost of gathering information about jobs and workers, and the effect of laws such as minimum wages. The second is that any attempt to hold unemployment below that rate by monetary means generates accelerating inflation once workers and firms come to expect it. Edmund Phelps reached the same conclusion in work published in 1967 and 1968, analysing how wages and prices are set when information is incomplete [2] [3]; the 2006 Nobel citation credits him with the expectations-augmented Phillips curve [4].
The policy implication was clear: monetary authorities cannot choose a permanently lower unemployment rate by accepting permanently higher inflation. They can create only a temporary trade-off that disappears as expectations adapt, so the long-run Phillips curve is vertical at the natural rate. The 1970s, when inflation and unemployment rose together, are the episode most often read as bearing the argument out, and the debate shifted from whether monetary policy could permanently raise output to how a central bank could make its commitment to price stability credible.
The address also argued that monetary policy acts with long and variable lags: policymakers respond to today's conditions, but their actions affect the economy 'only six or nine or twelve or fifteen months later', and the size of the effect varies with circumstances. Friedman concluded that the monetary authority should publicly adopt a steady rate of growth in a specified monetary total; for the United States he suggested something like 3 to 5 percent a year for currency plus all commercial bank deposits [1].
A Monetary History and the Great Contraction
A Monetary History of the United States, 1867-1960, published by Friedman and Schwartz in 1963 [5], is the empirical foundation of monetarist macroeconomics. Its most influential argument concerns the Great Contraction of 1929-33, which Friedman and Schwartz called 'a tragic testimonial to the importance of monetary forces' [6]. In the Federal Reserve's own account, its most serious failure was not stopping the fall in the money supply, which dropped by nearly 30 percent from the fall of 1930 through the winter of 1933 [7].
The argument was that the Depression's severity was not inevitable. It followed from policy decisions: the Fed did not use monetary policy to stop the collapse, and it did not act adequately as lender of last resort, so many banks failed and credit and the money supply contracted, an account Ben Bernanke repeated as Fed chairman [8]. The book challenged the view that the Depression reflected a fundamental instability of private capitalism, arguing instead that it reflected a failure of monetary management. The policy corollary: if monetary contraction causes deep recessions, monetary expansion can prevent them or at least shorten them.
In November 2002, at a conference to honor Friedman on his ninetieth birthday, Bernanke, then a Fed governor, endorsed that account and told Friedman and Schwartz: 'You're right, we did it. We're very sorry.' [6] As chairman he later presented the Fed's failures in the Depression as the lessons to keep in mind when judging how it responded to the financial crisis of 2008-09 [8].