Housing / Credit ABM Model
How do leverage, collateral values, and heterogeneous household balance sheets turn a housing or credit shock into an aggregate macro outcome with endogenous default cascades?
Understand the mathematics
Follow the same equations and assumptions one section at a time or in a continuous reading.
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Odd+D Protocol: Model Specification
The ODD+D (Overview, Design concepts, Details + Decision-making) protocol is the standard documentation format for agent-based models, introduced by Grimm et al. (2006, 2010) and extended by Muller et al. (2013) for decision-making. The protocol is applied here to the housing-credit ABM family.
PURPOSE: The model explores how heterogeneous household leverage, collateral-based lending, and bank capital constraints generate endogenous housing boom-bust cycles and default cascades that cannot be derived from representative-agent assumptions. The target audience is macroprudential policymakers evaluating LTV/LTI cap calibrations.
ENTITIES, STATE VARIABLES, AND SCALES: The model contains four entity types. Households ( to in research runs, 30 to 100 in toy demonstrations) carry state variables: income (continuous, positive), wealth (continuous), mortgage balance (continuous, non-negative), house value (continuous, positive if owned), LTV ratio (derived), and a binary housing tenure status. Banks ( to ) carry: mortgage portfolio (vector of active loans), capital ratio (continuous, 0 to 1), and lending standard parameters. Firms ( aggregate block) carry: revenue and wage bill. The policy block carries: policy rate and macroprudential caps. The spatial and temporal scales are quarterly periods over 20 to 80 quarters, with no explicit geographic dimension in the baseline specification.
PROCESS OVERVIEW AND SCHEDULING: Each period proceeds in fixed order: (1) income shocks arrive, (2) households evaluate buy/sell/default decisions, (3) the housing market clears via a batch auction or posted-price mechanism, (4) banks process new mortgage applications, (5) defaults are realized and losses allocated, (6) bank capital is updated and lending standards adjusted, (7) the policy block updates rates and caps, (8) aggregate statistics are recorded. This ordering is not arbitrary: it ensures that defaults are conditioned on current-period prices and income, not on stale values.
House price update rule. Excess demand drives appreciation; the noise term captures unmodeled shocks. This is not an equilibrium condition but a behavioral price-adjustment rule.
Household 's LTV at time . Numerator is the outstanding mortgage balance after scheduled amortization at rate a; denominator is current house value. Moves with both amortization (slow) and price changes (fast). Note that an origination LTV cap cannot bound this quantity: once the loan is on the books, a price fall raises LTV above any cap.
Default trigger. Requires BOTH negative equity beyond threshold AND debt-service-to-income above threshold , with debt service measured consistently as interest plus amortization. Double trigger matches empirical evidence that negative equity alone rarely causes default - and it also means negative equity is NECESSARY: no amount of payment stress produces a default while the household still has positive equity. On default the house is foreclosed (moved to supply), the loan is written off, and the household re-enters as a renter, so the same borrower cannot generate a loss twice.
Double-trigger default
Empirical mortgage default research (Foote et al. 2008, Gerardi et al. 2018) strongly supports the double-trigger hypothesis: negative equity is necessary but not sufficient for default. An income or payment shock must also be present. ABMs that use a single-trigger (negative equity only) overpredict default rates by 2x to 5x in calibrated runs.
Price formation is behavioral, not equilibrium
The house price update rule is a tatonnement-style adjustment, not a market-clearing equilibrium condition. This is deliberate: housing markets do not clear instantaneously, and the adjustment speed () is itself a parameter that reflects market microstructure. Variants include order-book mechanisms (Geanakoplos et al.) and posted-price search (Baptista et al.).
Why multiple banks matter
With a single bank, mortgage losses are pooled and the capital constraint binds uniformly. With multiple banks, losses concentrate in whichever bank holds the high-LTV mortgages, triggering localized lending tightening that feeds back into the specific market segment served by that bank. This concentration effect is invisible in single-bank specifications.
Transition checks
Agent update
The aggregate is computed after individual states are updated. If the rule is nonlinear or stochastic, the aggregate can change abruptly even when the plotted line connects adjacent periods.
Each point is an aggregate after one model update. The connecting line helps the eye, but the law is discrete.
Do not read the line as a continuous differential equation unless one is stated.
Cutoff and contagion
The indicator changes value discontinuously at . Aggregates inherit that discontinuity when enough agents sit near the cutoff.
A cutoff creates a kink or jump because the update rule changes at the threshold.
Do not force a smooth explanation onto a chart section driven by threshold crossing.
Variable timing
Agent state
Agent states update at dates. Abrupt aggregate movement can come from many small state changes applied at once.
Aggregate readout
The aggregate can jump when the distribution changes shape or many agents cross a boundary.
Threshold indicator
The indicator turns on at the cutoff. That creates a discontinuity in the micro rule and possibly the aggregate.