The Taylor rule is a benchmark reaction function, not a full optimal policy solution.
It summarizes behavior rather than deriving it from a welfare problem.
Macro by Mark の Cookie.ログイン、言語、安全性のために必須 Cookie を使用します。許可いただいた場合は、設定の保存、分析、Meta(Facebook)ピクセルによる広告計測のために任意の Cookie も使用します。詳しくはCookie ポリシーをご覧ください。
A policy rule linking the nominal interest rate to inflation and output gaps, giving a compact view of monetary reaction functions.
How aggressively should the policy rate react to inflation and output gaps?
John Taylor (1993) proposed a formula for the federal funds rate that fit historical Fed behavior surprisingly well. The rule sets the nominal rate as a function of two gaps: inflation above target and output above potential.
The appeal is transparency: a fixed formula makes the contribution of each input visible. With the nominal rate moves more than one-for-one with inflation (the Taylor principle), so the real rate rises when inflation rises; in New Keynesian models that response keeps inflation stable (Clarida, Galí and Gertler 2000; Woodford 2003). Whether a given rule improves outcomes in practice is an empirical question.
The rule became a benchmark for comparing an observed policy rate with a conditional prescription. That comparison depends on the inflation measure, output-gap estimate, neutral-rate estimate, and coefficients chosen before the comparison.
Nominal interest rate set by the central bank.
The corresponding element is highlighted on the graph.
The rule sets a policy rate matching the baseline configuration.
The active inflation response is positive, so the rule raises the real rate when inflation rises.
The rule is . With , the nominal prescription rises 1.5-for-1 with inflation, so its implied current real-rate prescription rises with inflation. This page does not compute the resulting demand or inflation response.
Each term has a mechanical role: sets a level anchor, current inflation supplies the Fisher term, scales the current inflation gap, and scales the current output gap. The formula does not derive the coefficients from a welfare objective.
The graph places the output gap on the horizontal axis and the policy rate on the vertical axis. Changing tilts the line because is its slope. Changing , inflation, or the inflation target shifts the line vertically. Changing also shifts the line at a fixed current inflation gap; it has no effect when inflation equals target.
It summarizes behavior rather than deriving it from a welfare problem.
Central banks and analysts consult several policy rules as benchmarks rather than mechanically following one specification. Comparing prescriptions can show how much a result depends on the chosen coefficients and real-time gap estimates.
The difference between an observed rate and a Taylor-rule prescription is a rule residual, not an identified monetary-policy shock. A causal shock measure needs an identification design that separates policy choices from policymakers' information and economic conditions.
Changing or changes the static prescription. Whether a larger coefficient improves inflation or output stability is a dynamic and welfare question for a model that includes private-sector behavior, expectations, and a stated loss criterion.
Inflation is 4%, the target is 2%, output is at potential, and the neutral rate is 2%, as in Taylor (1993). Plug into the Taylor Rule. What rate does it prescribe, and what is the real rate? (The graph opens with at 0.5%, a lower illustrative value; move the slider to 2 to match.)
The observed policy rate differs from the prescription. What can this page call a residual, and what extra evidence would be needed to call it an exogenous policy shock?
Raise from 0.5 to 1.0 first with inflation above target and then with inflation at target. Does the plotted line tilt or shift? How is changing different?
If the neutral real rate is uncertain (a live debate since 2010), how does that uncertainty affect the reliability of the rule?