Endogenous money and credit creation
The post-Keynesian theory of endogenous money holds that the supply of money in the economy is not set by the central bank but is created by commercial banks in response to demand for credit. When a bank makes a loan, it creates a deposit simultaneously. The loan is the asset; the deposit is the liability. No prior saving or reserve accumulation is required. The Bank of England's 2014 Quarterly Bulletin [1] confirmed this operational description: 'commercial banks create money, in the form of bank deposits, by making new loans.'
The policy implication is that the money supply is largely endogenous to credit demand rather than an exogenous quantity set directly by the central bank. Monetary policy operates through the interest rate, which influences the cost of credit and therefore the demand for it, but the central bank does not mechanically set the quantity of bank lending. Quantitative targets for monetary aggregates can perform poorly when credit demand, bank balance sheets, and velocity shift away from the assumptions behind the target.
Minsky's financial instability hypothesis [2] connected endogenous money to systemic risk. Units that can meet all their payment obligations from cash flow are hedge financed; units that can pay interest but must roll over principal are speculative; units whose cash flow covers neither are Ponzi financed and must borrow or sell assets to pay. Over periods of prolonged prosperity, Minsky argued, an economy moves from a structure dominated by hedge finance toward one with much speculative and Ponzi finance, and from stability toward instability. That is why financial stability requires more than price stability.
Effective demand, uncertainty, and the investment decision
Post-Keynesian economics preserves Keynes's distinction between calculable risk and fundamental uncertainty. Risk can be measured by a probability distribution drawn from repeated trials. Uncertainty, in Keynes's usage, refers to situations where the future is genuinely novel, where no stable probability distribution exists because the relevant precedents do not. The investment decision is made under fundamental uncertainty: the investor does not know the return on a new factory because that return depends on future prices, technologies, and competitor decisions that are not yet determined.
This leads directly to the animal spirits argument. Investment is driven by conventional expectations, waves of optimism and pessimism that can shift without any change in underlying fundamentals. Keynes described investment as depending on the 'state of long-term expectation', which rests on the confidence with which forecasts are made as well as on the forecasts themselves [3]. The aggregate demand for investment is therefore inherently unstable, and no automatic mechanism can guarantee that it will be sufficient to maintain full employment.
Keynes drew the consequence himself: because enterprise rests on animal spirits as well as calculation, 'slumps and depressions are exaggerated in degree' (chapter 12). Post-Keynesians read him alongside Michał Kalecki, whose essays from 1933 to 1970 are collected in a 1971 volume [4], and conclude that fiscal policy and financial regulation must carry the load when private investment falters, rather than waiting for prices to restore full employment.