This model asks how one firm's default travels through the banks that lend to it and becomes a credit crunch for other firms. A model with one representative bank and one representative firm cannot pose that question, because it has no network of credit relationships: which bank lends to which firm, how concentrated those exposures are, and how a default at one firm propagates through its lender's balance sheet to affect credit supply for every other firm that bank serves. Delli Gatti et al. (2005) showed, with heterogeneous firms financed by an aggregate banking sector, that business-cycle fluctuations can emerge endogenously from the interaction of firm balance sheets and bank lending decisions, without any aggregate shock at all: bankruptcies erode the bank's equity, and a smaller equity base means less credit for every surviving firm. The key insight was that cross-sectional dispersion in firm net worth generates correlated default clusters that look like recessions even when the only shocks are idiosyncratic. Delli Gatti, Gallegati, Greenwald, Russo, and Stiglitz (2010) then made the credit links explicit: an evolving network in which downstream firms buy on trade credit from upstream suppliers and both borrow from banks, so that one bankruptcy can set off an avalanche of others along the links. It is a partial model of the credit network, not a closed macroeconomy.
The core mechanism is a balance-sheet amplification loop running through the firm-bank network. A firm's borrowing capacity depends on its net worth (the external finance premium story from Bernanke-Gertler, but applied heterogeneously). When a firm defaults, its bank absorbs a loss, the bank's capital ratio drops, and the bank tightens lending standards or rations credit to all its borrowers. Those borrowers, now credit-constrained, cut investment and production, which reduces aggregate demand, which lowers revenues for other firms, pushing marginal firms toward default. The cascade propagates through the bipartite firm-bank network: each bank failure or capital squeeze affects all firms connected to it, and each wave of firm defaults affects all banks exposed to those firms. The severity depends on network concentration - a few large banks serving many firms create systemic fragility that a dispersed network does not.
Firm-bank ABMs are used to study how corporate defaults propagate through lenders and how capital requirements and buffers change that propagation. The Eurace model (Cincotti et al. 2010, Deissenberg et al. 2008) - built by an EU Sixth Framework Programme research consortium, not by the ECB - includes a detailed firm-bank credit module as part of a full-scale agent-based macroeconomy used for policy experiments. Chan-Lau's IMF ABBA model is an agent-based model of the banking system; Bookstaber, Paddrik, and Tivnan's financial-vulnerability ABM traces funding, collateral, and fire-sale feedback. Together they are better read as adjacent macro-financial ABM references than as a single named firm-bank contagion module. Ashraf, Gershman, and Howitt (2017) add a banking sector to a computational macroeconomy and show that bank lending and bank failure materially change macro performance, especially in downturns; read it as a mechanism result about the bank lending channel rather than as a country calibration. Academic use spans from pure network contagion theory (Battiston et al. 2012) to applied regulatory evaluation (countercyclical capital buffers, leverage ratio floors).
The model family has evolved along several axes since the mid-2000s. Early versions used random matching between firms and banks; newer variants use preferential attachment or fitness-based network formation where firms sort to banks based on interest rate offers and relationship length. Bank behavior has moved from mechanical lending rules to active portfolio optimization with risk-weighted capital constraints under Basel-type regulation. The interbank market has been added as a second network layer, allowing contagion to propagate both through direct exposures (firm defaults eroding bank capital) and through interbank funding freezes (distressed banks unable to roll over wholesale funding). The active frontier includes climate transition risk overlays (stranded-asset defaults propagating through bank networks), supply-chain-finance interactions (trade credit as a parallel contagion channel), and central bank digital currency effects on bank funding structure.