Fiscal Policy & Inequality ABM Model
How do progressive taxation, targeted transfers, and public investment interact with household-level income heterogeneity and heterogeneous marginal propensities to consume to shape aggregate demand, growth, and the size of fiscal multipliers?
Graph workspace
Multi-panel time-series with distributional sidebar
Fiscal-inequality ABMs produce stochastic time series (GDP, government debt, employment) alongside cross-sectional distributions (income distribution, wealth Gini, MPC distribution). The canonical visualization pairs a time-series panel showing aggregate output response to fiscal shocks with a bar chart of quintile-level consumption responses, making the distributional multiplier mechanism visible in one view.
Current results
GDP Index
Current GDP relative to period-0 baseline. Responds to fiscal policy changes with a lag determined by the MPC chain and the employment feedback loop.
86.88
index
Post-Tax Gini
Gini coefficient of disposable income. Falls with progressive taxation and targeted transfers. The gap between pre-tax and post-tax Gini measures the redistributive power of the fiscal system.
0.2198
ratio
Fiscal Multiplier
Ratio of the output change to the TOTAL fiscal impulse relative to the baseline run, not to government purchases alone. Defining it over would leave the readout undefined for any preset that moves only transfers or only tax rates, which two of the three presets do. In the full model it is undefined only when the total impulse is zero, and it is higher when fiscal dollars flow to high-MPC households. This page's illustrative sketch does not compute it and shows a blank in every scenario: it runs a single path with no tax, transfer or purchase accounts, so it produces neither the fiscal impulse nor a matched no-stimulus run to measure the output change against.
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ratio
Debt-to-GDP
Government debt as a fraction of ANNUALIZED GDP. Periods are quarters, so the quarterly output flow is multiplied by four before dividing; without that the ratio would read four times the conventional measure. Rises with deficit spending, falls when GDP growth outpaces the deficit. Endogenous to the fiscal multiplier - higher multipliers can reduce the debt ratio even when the deficit rises.
1.63
ratio
Controls
Tax progressivity: 0.15
How much more the top bracket pays than the bottom; zero means a single flat rate.
Higher progressivity compresses the post-tax income distribution (lower Gini), increases disposable income for high-MPC households, and raises the aggregate fiscal multiplier for any given level of government spending.
Transfer share of GDP: 0.05
Money paid to the bottom 30% of households, measured as a share of GDP.
Higher transfer share boosts consumption of low-income households, raising GDP and reducing inequality. The GDP effect is larger when transfers are targeted at high-MPC households.
Govt spending share: 0.2
What government buys in goods and services, as a share of the economy's output.
Higher government spending raises GDP directly. The multiplier effect depends on how government purchases translate into wages and which households receive those wages.
Max MPC (low wealth): 0.85
How much of an extra dollar the lowest-wealth households spend.
Higher max MPC amplifies the consumption response of low-income households to transfers and progressive taxation, widening the gap between distributional and aggregate multipliers.
Wealth-to-income ratio at which the MPC sits exactly halfway between and . It is the third parameter of the MPC function alongside and , and it is the one the micro evidence pins down least well.
A low makes MPC fall steeply with wealth but compresses the whole schedule downward; a high flattens the schedule near . The low-wealth/high-wealth MPC ratio is therefore non-monotonic in , peaking near at about 1.95 and falling back to 1.65 by .
Income dispersion: 0.7
How spread out incomes are before tax; higher settings mean more unequal pay.
Higher income dispersion widens the income distribution, increasing the pre-tax Gini and the scope for progressive taxation to compress inequality. Also increases the mass of high-MPC households near the bottom.