The same logic applies to promises made by governments. A central bank that promises low inflation is tempted, once wages and prices have been set, to allow a little more inflation for a short-run boost to output. People know this, so they build higher inflation into wages and loan rates from the start, and the country ends up with more inflation and no extra output. This is the time-consistency problem identified by Kydland and Prescott (1977). The remedy is a commitment that is costly to break: an independent central bank with an inflation target, a fiscal rule that caps deficits or debt, or a currency board.
On 6 May 1997 the UK government announced that the Bank of England, not ministers, would set interest rates to meet the government's inflation target. That day the yield on ten-year government bonds fell 0.29 percentage points, to 7.08%, and the inflation rate that bond prices implied for ten years ahead fell 0.47 points, to 3.70%. The Bank's Quarterly Bulletin read this as a sign that the credibility of monetary policy had been reinforced. In plain terms, investors asked for less compensation for future inflation once the decision was out of ministers' hands.
The idea is easy to stretch too far. Institutions are not just laws on paper: a constitution that guarantees property rights or central bank independence means little if courts and politicians ignore it, and credibility built over decades can be lost quickly. Good institutions are not a single blueprint, because the same job, such as protecting investors, is done by different legal arrangements in different rich countries. And the word is not a catch-all for culture or geography. It refers to specific rules that can be named and compared. How these rules shape long-run income is covered in Economic Growth and Economic Development, and fiscal rules in Budget Deficits and Public Debt.