Take a country that exports 500 and imports 620 of goods and services, a trade deficit of 120. It earns 40 more in income from abroad than it pays out, and sends 10 abroad in transfers. Its current account deficit is 120 − 40 + 10 = 90. Its capital account shows a surplus of 2, so over the year it is a net borrower of 88. If the books were perfect, the financial account would show exactly that: liabilities to foreigners up by 88 more than assets held abroad.
Real data never fit exactly. In 2025 the United States ran a current account deficit of $1,177 billion, 3.8% of GDP, and a capital account surplus of $1 billion, which makes it a net borrower of $1,176 billion. The financial account tells nearly the same story from the other side. US residents bought $1,665 billion of foreign assets, foreigners bought $2,928 billion of US assets and derivatives subtracted $40 billion, for net borrowing of $1,303 billion. The $127 billion gap between the two measures is the statistical discrepancy, which BPM6 calls net errors and omissions (Bureau of Economic Analysis, June 2026).
The vocabulary invites misreading. The balance of payments as a whole cannot be in deficit, because it always sums to zero. When people speak of a deficit they mean one account, usually the current account. A current account deficit is not money lost: it is matched by foreign money coming in as investment or loans, and whether that is healthy depends on what the money pays for. And reserves are not a fourth account. Under BPM6 they sit inside the financial account. A successor manual, BPM7, was released in March 2025, and the IMF recommends that countries adopt it in 2029 and 2030. Why currencies move when these flows shift is covered in Exchange Rates, and why countries trade at all in International Trade.