The Money Multiplier
Textbook macro often introduces a money multiplier in which banks lend out deposits subject to reserve requirements, creating a larger stock of money than the original deposit alone.
That framework is still useful as a teaching device, but it can overstate how mechanical the process is in a modern banking system where lending, reserves, and central-bank operations interact more flexibly. In the United States there is no longer a requirement to multiply: reserve requirement ratios have been zero since March 26, 2020 [1].
Money Creation in Practice
In practice, bank lending creates deposits, and central banks manage the reserve environment around that process rather than passively watching a fixed multiplier unfold [2].
That is why macroeconomists often look at money, credit, lending standards, and rates together instead of treating the money stock as a standalone control knob.
Why It Still Matters
Money growth alone does not tell you where inflation is going, but ignoring money and credit entirely leaves out how financing conditions are changing underneath the economy.
That makes money supply most useful when it is read alongside inflation, asset prices, and the broader financial system.
For financial-stability work, composition carries the signal. A shift from risky lending into liquid deposits can make money look abundant while credit risk is actually tightening.
Friedman, Schwartz, and the 1929-33 collapse
A Monetary History of the United States, 1867-1960, came out in 1963 [3]. Anna Schwartz did most of the data work; Friedman wrote the chapters. Their argument about 1929-33 has held up better than almost any other macroeconomic claim of the postwar period. The Federal Reserve, they wrote, allowed the money stock to fall by about a third between October 1929 and March 1933. Two-fifths of that was the public's loss of trust in banks and the resulting flight to currency. The rest was the Fed's failure to offset bank failures with reserve creation.
There were five separate banking panics. The November 1930 panic took out 256 banks in a single month. The Bank of United States failed in December 1930 with $200 million in deposits. The Fed's regional banks were divided about whether to act, and the Board in Washington had ambiguous authority. The result was the largest peacetime contraction in the money stock that had ever been measured.
Bernanke ended his speech at Friedman's 90th birthday in 2002 with the sentence: 'Regarding the Great Depression, you're right, we did it. We're very sorry. But thanks to you, we won't do it again.' [4] Six years later, he was running the Fed during the second-largest banking crisis of the modern era. The Friedman-Schwartz reading was the operating manual: do not let the money stock collapse, even if that requires extraordinary instruments. The 2008-09 doctrine was written in 1963.
September 2019 and the limits of plumbing
On Tuesday, September 17, 2019, the Secured Overnight Financing Rate jumped sharply in a single morning [5]. The fed funds rate breached the top of the Fed's target range. There was no obvious shock. Corporate tax payments and a large Treasury settlement had drained roughly $100 billion of reserves out of the banking system on the same day. Reserves were at $1.4 trillion, low by post-crisis standards but still huge in historical terms. The market jammed anyway.
Two things had happened that the framework had not fully priced. The Fed had been running balance-sheet runoff (QT) since late 2017. Reserves had fallen from $2.7 trillion to $1.4 trillion. Banks subject to liquidity coverage ratios (LCR) preferred to hold reserves rather than Treasury securities, even though the regulations counted both as high-quality liquid assets. The willingness of banks to lend reserves to dealers in the repo market had collapsed faster than reserves themselves, which made the demand curve far steeper than the Open Market Desk had projected [5].
The response was administrative. The Fed restarted overnight repo operations within twenty-four hours. By July 2021 it had committed to a Standing Repo Facility, a permanent backstop that takes Treasuries and lends reserves at a posted rate. SRF is now the safety valve. The 2019 episode is the practical reason most central-bank watchers track reserve balances and the iceberg of repo-rate dispersion together. When reserves get scarce, even modestly, the price of overnight liquidity moves first.
March 2023: deposits, duration, and the discount window
Silicon Valley Bank failed on Friday, March 10, 2023. The textbook story is correct as far as it goes: SVB had taken in a flood of deposits during the 2020-21 venture-capital boom, parked the deposits in long-duration Treasuries and agency MBS, and watched their market value collapse as the Fed raised rates from zero to 4.5 percent in twelve months. Held-to-maturity accounting masked the loss until withdrawals forced sales. The bank had also taken on an unusual deposit profile: about 95 percent of deposits were uninsured, and almost all customers were correlated venture-backed startups who talked to each other.
The interesting part is what happened on Sunday, March 12. The Treasury, FDIC, and Federal Reserve announced that all SVB deposits, insured and uninsured, would be made whole. The Fed simultaneously stood up the Bank Term Funding Program, which would lend against eligible securities at par rather than at market value. The signal was that the deposit-insurance ceiling was effectively suspended for any depository institution that ran into similar stress. The conventional reading of FDIC insurance, that $250,000 was the limit on protected deposits, lost most of its meaning in one weekend.
First Republic, Signature, and several smaller banks followed. The Fed's H.4.1 release showed discount-window borrowing spike to $152.9 billion in the week ended March 15, 2023, past its 2008 record, while BTFP balances were still small; BTFP did not peak above $165 billion until January 2024, once its rate had fallen below interest on reserves. Reserves rose by about $300 billion in two weeks because the Fed's own lending expanded its balance sheet: the discount window, the BTFP, and credit to the FDIC bridge banks. Deposits leaving small banks for money-market funds redistributed claims but could not create reserves: aggregate reserve balances are a Federal Reserve liability and move only when the Fed's balance sheet moves. The 2023 episode is now a central case study in liquidity-versus-solvency under a regulator that decided not to let the distinction matter.